Careful how you handle that Dave. Our Board has gone after a surveyor pretty much with everything they've got for considering the circumstances surrounding the conveyance. The respondent won twice in civil court against the complainant's charges, and the complainant dropped an appeal because there was nothing to appeal. Complainant wasn't satisfied, took it to BPELSG, who was only too happy to write a citation for having considered unfiled surveys and for rejecting a filed survey that had based the boundary of the parcel on two distant monuments that had no direct record relationship to the subject property, and for giving consideration to the circumstances surrounding the conveyance that divided the parcel from larger contiguous holdings of the grantor.
The respondent again won on all charges except partially on one because the judge misinterpreted some timelines in the evidence, but also feeling that the supposed violation was so minor that he reduced the total fine to $50. BPELSG is not happy with that and has rejected the Judge's Proposed Decision and will decide the case for themselves based on "the record."
Brian Allen, post: 327883, member: 1333 wrote: Oh come on John!! We have all repeatedly heard that an "existing" 16th corner can only be accepted if it can be "proved" that it was set by a licensed land surveyor using correct methodology. 😉
Here's the real question;
How do you retrace the survey that follows this line of thinking? Or better yet; the adjoiner's property?
IMWTK...
wow- some State boards hardly have a pulse and others have Tourette syndrome :-/
eapls2708, post: 328271, member: 589 wrote: Careful how you handle that Dave. Our Board has gone after a surveyor pretty much with everything they've got for considering the circumstances surrounding the conveyance. The respondent won twice in civil court against the complainant's charges, and the complainant dropped an appeal because there was nothing to appeal. Complainant wasn't satisfied, took it to BPELSG, who was only too happy to write a citation for having considered unfiled surveys and for rejecting a filed survey that had based the boundary of the parcel on two distant monuments that had no direct record relationship to the subject property, and for giving consideration to the circumstances surrounding the conveyance that divided the parcel from larger contiguous holdings of the grantor.
The respondent again won on all charges except partially on one because the judge misinterpreted some timelines in the evidence, but also feeling that the supposed violation was so minor that he reduced the total fine to $50. BPELSG is not happy with that and has rejected the Judge's Proposed Decision and will decide the case for themselves based on "the record."
If this is the case we should drop the P off of PLS. Maybe change it to TLS.
Here is the timeline:
1888: Oscar (real) Madison (not real) acquires the SE1/4 of the SE1/4 of the Section (plus the NE1/4 of the NE1/4 of the Section to the south).
1894: Timber Company Surveyor Chicolini (not licensed, licensing starts in 1892 in CA) sets the SE1/16th corner, a redwood post.
Hereafter: Plaintiff's property Defendant's property
1897: Oscar Madison grants a portion of his 40 to Julius Henry Marx (not real) using the description in this discussion (PIQ). It begins at a point on the legal subdivision line 400' east of the SE1/16th corner, thence west 400', thence south 300' to the County Road (now a State Highway), etc. There was, until recently, an old fence about 405' east of Chicolini's redwood post. Note: 400 does not equal 400.000000000000000000000000.
1915: Oscar Madison dies, remaining property goes to Anna Madison. Anna immediately grants it to Edgar (real) G. Robinson (not real).
1919: Edgar et ux grants remaining property to E.O.Robinson. It is called the fractional se1/4 of the se1/4 at 36 acres. This is a normal section; I think they are trying to convey that they no longer owned the entire 40.
1924: Remaining property goes back to Edgar G. Robinson. Then Edgar grants it to Alfred E. Neuman (almost real) and his wife. This is the remaining property.
1943: Neuman grants the remaining property to Phillips (not real).
1945: Julius Henry Marx grants the PIQ to Mannix (not real).
1958: Defendant acquires the PIQ through mesne conveyances from Mannix.
1971: Phillips grants the remaining property to the Plaintiff (Plaintiff is daughter and son-in-law of Phillips).
Conclusion: the defendant is senior; the description should have been construed in his favor (as in construing against the grantor who is an ancestor in title of the plaintiff).
