Monte, post: 388324, member: 11913 wrote: Maybe it was the Tennessee side of the deed participants who wrote in the "cotton pickin" part?
My impeccable interweb research indicates that "cotton pickin' " probably obscurely originated in the deep South sometime after the War of Northern Aggression.
However further research indicates that in recent years the State of Texas reported almost 8 million acres of cotton cultivated annually . Given this data I have concluded that even if the said vernacular wasn't originated in Texas; folks there probably have at least earned the right of utilization. 😉
Andy Nold, post: 388271, member: 7 wrote: So, do I calc a 1 acre parallelogram? Fwiw, an LSLS came up with the same construction of the section as I did. It ain't a square.
Yes. The controlling case is Wood v. Selby Oil & Gas in which that was exactly how the court held a specific quantity of land out of a particular corner of a known tract of land should be located (without cheating and actually rereading the case).
Okay, I cheated and looked. Make that
Woods v. Selby Oil & Gas
2 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927)
Basically, the rationale for constructing the "1 acre in the form of a square" as a rhombus adjoining the lines of the parent tract forming the specific corner mentioned when an exact geometric square isn't possible is that it is what most people would ordinarily intend.
W
Kent McMillan, post: 388480, member: 3 wrote: Okay, I cheated and looked. Make that
Woods v. Selby Oil & Gas
2 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927)
It would be interesting to look at the Westlaw Headnotes on that case to see where Westlaw fits it into the Keycite hierarchy under boundaries.
I think that the case was wrongly decided by the court in declining to contruct the deed to the North 80 acres in light of the prior conveyance of the South 75 acres. It seems transparently true that the description of the tract as "the North 80 acres" properly refers to a part into which the tract had been subdivided a few days before.
The reason for the construction of a part of a tract out of a particular corner or off of a particular side as being in the form of a parallelogram is basically that is what people ordinarily intend. That same rationale would seem to me to apply to constructing the North 80 acres as being the northern remainder of the tract that had previously been divided into a 75 acre South part in a way that left a North part that was thought to contain 80 acres.
As a bona-fide Texan, I can tell you unequivocally that many use the term "cotton-pickin" to replace "God D&#n". That is a derivative, I'm told, from the old people who REALLY didn't enjoy picking the cotton. My grandfather and grandmother picked cotton as share croppers in the depression. They never cussed, but lamented about the terrible nature of picking cotton.
Kris Morgan, post: 388506, member: 29 wrote: ...My grandfather and grandmother picked cotton as share croppers in the depression. They never cussed, but lamented about the terrible nature of picking cotton.
My grandfather also farmed cotton in the '20s and '30s. Almost in Texas, just north of the Red River in, of course, Cotton County. He and my uncles never did speak highly of picking cotton either.
I do have a number of old black and white photos of them standing in or near the cotton field. And the first thing noticeable is the lack of any smiles on anybody's sunburned faces. I have drawn my own conclusion from that evidence....
Kent McMillan, post: 388480, member: 3 wrote: Okay, I cheated and looked. Make that
Woods v. Selby Oil & Gas
2 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927)
That is a strange case.
There is discussion of the Parol Evidence Rule but they don't call it that. They seem to be criticizing the Judgment but then later affirm it.
Apparently the there is a triangular gap between the south 75 acres and the northwest 80 acres; the gap contains a producing well. Also apparently the original grantor disclaimed his interest in the gap to the 75 acre owner (who was senior) hence the affirmance. The 80 acre owner couldn't claim the gap on the strength of his own title therefore he couldn't ultimately get Judgment.
Dave Karoly, post: 388554, member: 94 wrote: That is a strange case.
There is discussion of the Parol Evidence Rule but they don't call it that. They seem to be criticizing the Judgment but then later affirm it.
Apparently the there is a triangular gap between the south 75 acres and the northwest 80 acres; the gap contains a producing well. Also apparently the original grantor disclaimed his interest in the gap to the 75 acre owner (who was senior) hence the affirmance. The 80 acre owner couldn't claim the gap on the strength of his own title therefore he couldn't ultimately get Judgment.
I jumped on the real problem being that the court understood the description "North 80 acres" as completely unambiguous and independent of circumstances, However, given that the conveyance was of only a 1/2 interest in and to their royalty or in the oil, gas, and other minerals on a certain tract of land, it may well be that the grantors could have also conveyed another 1/2 interest in and to any part of the 75 acres after the initial deed to Selby Oil & Gas Co. So the triangular overlap between the 75 acres and the 80 acres was helf to be not important to the construction of the deed to the 80 acres to Woods.
Kent McMillan, post: 388559, member: 3 wrote: I jumped on the real problem being that the court understood the description "North 80 acres" as completely unambiguous and independent of circumstances, However, given that the conveyance was of only a 1/2 interest in and to their royalty or in the oil, gas, and other minerals on a certain tract of land, it may well be that the grantors could have also conveyed another 1/2 interest in and to any part of the 75 acres after the initial deed to Selby Oil & Gas Co. So the triangular overlap between the 75 acres and the 80 acres was helf to be not important to the construction of the deed to the 80 acres to Woods.
Reading it again, it seems the Court says Appellees (Selby? Apparently in Texas the Appellate Courts put the parties in order of Appellant-Appellee regardless of who the Plaintiff was) should get 75 acres with its north line parallel to the south line and the Appellants should get 80 acres likewise off the north (pursuant to standard rules of construction of unambiguous deeds) but since one of the Appellants (Fry the original grantor) disclaimed any interest the triangular vacancy between the 80 and 75 on the west (they conflict on the east) in their answer to the lawsuit Appellee (who was the Plaintiff) wins. They don't deal with the conflict which presumably would go to the 75 because of Senior rights. The real issue is a producing oil well in the vacancy.
They essentially say the Appellants are right that the 75 should only be 75 as described for various reasons but since Fry disclaimed the vacancy he spoke for all the parties on that side of the case. Oops.
Dave Karoly, post: 388567, member: 94 wrote: They essentially say the Appellants are right that the 75 should only be 75 as described for various reasons but since Fry disclaimed the vacancy he spoke for all the parties on that side of the case. Oops.
I read the minority concurring minority opinion as making the most sense in rejecting an arbitrary rule of construction when it is manifestly contrary to the obvious intentions of the parties.
"The general rule applied in the majority opinion is well established. It is, however, only a rule of construction which the courts apply as being a reasonable interpretation of the intention of the parties, in order to uphold a conveyance, rather than declare it void for uncertainty in description. Where land is described generally by acreage out of a corner or off a side of a larger tract, the courts will construct a survey of the designated acreage, by lines drawn parallel to the designated line or lines of the larger tract; not, however, because the parties have so stated in their writing, but because the writing is silent on the subject, and the presumption that they so intended is deduced from what men ordinarily would do under like circumstances. In the absence of some presumption, such description must be held void for uncertainty. The general rule must necessarily apply to Woods' contract, because no other rule was applicable at the time it was executed. It should not, however, I think be applied to appellees' contract and deed, when to do so would create the situation above outlined and defeat an intention of the parties which is both manifest and conceded."
Kent McMillan, post: 388576, member: 3 wrote: I read the minority concurring minority opinion as making the most sense in rejecting an arbitrary rule of construction when it is manifestly contrary to the obvious intentions of the parties.
"The general rule applied in the majority opinion is well established. It is, however, only a rule of construction which the courts apply as being a reasonable interpretation of the intention of the parties, in order to uphold a conveyance, rather than declare it void for uncertainty in description. Where land is described generally by acreage out of a corner or off a side of a larger tract, the courts will construct a survey of the designated acreage, by lines drawn parallel to the designated line or lines of the larger tract; not, however, because the parties have so stated in their writing, but because the writing is silent on the subject, and the presumption that they so intended is deduced from what men ordinarily would do under like circumstances. In the absence of some presumption, such description must be held void for uncertainty. The general rule must necessarily apply to Woods' contract, because no other rule was applicable at the time it was executed. It should not, however, I think be applied to appellees' contract and deed, when to do so would create the situation above outlined and defeat an intention of the parties which is both manifest and conceded."
I didn't read the concurring opinion before.
Dave Karoly, post: 388584, member: 94 wrote: I didn't read the concurring opinion before.
One interesting element of the concurring opinion is that its analysis would consider that in the case where two parties holding under deeds given by a common grantor were aware that their deeds had been given pursuant to the terms of a contract of sale and the descriptions in the deeds were exactly congruent with those in the contracts, that the date of execution of the contracts of sale would determine the prior right of possession, not the date of the deed.
The other more general rule I'd draw from the concurring opinion is "You should not use rules of construction blindly to produce a result that is plainly contrary to the stated intentions of the parties." In the above case, where the parent tract was admitted to be 155 acres in area and there were exactly two conveyances out of it, one for 80 acres to Woods and one for 75 acres to Selby Oil & Gas Co., it's ridiculous to apply a method of contruction to both that does not cover the entire tract.
Kent McMillan, post: 388602, member: 3 wrote: One interesting element of the concurring opinion is that its analysis would consider that in the case where two parties holding under deeds given by a common grantor were aware that their deeds had been given pursuant to the terms of a contract of sale and the descriptions in the deeds were exactly congruent with those in the contracts, that the date of execution of the contracts of sale would determine the prior right of possession, not the date of the deed.
The concurring opinion offers the better analysis of the case. However, the majority opinion is the ruling which has to be followed by other Courts. The concurring opinion is considered merely persuasive. If later Texas cases adopted the view of the concurring opinion then it would gain more authority.
It seems to me that that the minority opinion has been cited by later courts, but I can't recall in what case or context.
