Who owns submerged land next to Martins Beach?
Hint: Get your coordinates ready !
http://blogs.mercurynews.com/internal-affairs/2015/01/05/martins-beach-khosla-submerged-lands/
Cheers,
Derek
I know I'm not a PLSS type and I know the article was written by a news guy, but are some people misapplying the term "meander line" when the try to say a "meander line" and an "ambulatory line" are the same? As I understand it, a "meander line" is a description of a line at a moment in time.
From the CookBook:
> 3-115. The traverse of the margin of a permanent natural body of water is termed a meander line. All navigable bodies of water and other important rivers and lakes are segregated from the public lands at mean high-water elevation. In original surveys, meander lines are run for the purpose of ascertaining the quantity of land remaining after segregation of the water area.
> The running of meander lines has always been authorized in the survey of public lands fronting on large streams and other bodies of water. But the mere fact that an irregular or sinuous line must be run, as in the case of a reservation boundary, does not entitle it to be called a meander line except where it closely follows the bank of a stream or lake. The legal riparian rights connected with meander lines do not apply in the case of other irregular lines, as the latter are strict boundaries.
> Low-water mark is the point to which a river or other body of water recedes, under ordinary conditions, at its lowest stage. High-water mark is the line which the water impresses on the soil by covering it for sufficient periods to deprive it of vegetation. The shore is the space between the margin of the water at its lowest stage and the banks at high-water mark. Alabama v. Georgia, 64 U.S. 505 (1859).
> Numerous decisions in the United States Supreme Court assert the principle that meander lines are not boundaries defining the area of ownership of lands adjacent to the water. The general rule is that meander lines are run not as boundaries, but to define the sinuosities of the banks of the stream or other body of water, and as a means of ascertaining the quantity of land embraced in the survey; the stream, or other body of water, and not the meander line as actually run on the ground, is the boundary. When by action of water the bed of the body of water changes, high-water mark changes, and the ownership of adjoining land progresses with it. Lane v. United States, 274 Fed. 290 (1921).
> Meander lines will not be established at the segregation line between upland and swamp or overflowed land, but at the ordinary high-water mark of the actual margin of the river or lake on which such swamp or overflowed lands border.
Radar's got it. Meander lines are a representation of the true ambulatory boundary at a point in time, to be used for the convenience of mapping and area calculations. Whenever meander lines are involved, it is an indication of a moving boundary in the vicinity of the meander courses.
As to the case and the premise of Khosla, Jennifer and Curtis explained it well and the journalist actually reported their explanations pretty accurately.
The waterward boundary of the Rancho is the Pacific Ocean. Khosla claims that since the original grant was in the form of a Mexican Land Grant (Rancho), he owns the tidelands, or owns to where the meanders of the original Rancho survey place the shore line. That's a convoluted argument because the two types of land would necessarily have different sources of title. The Spanish and Mexican governments did not generally grant tidelands.
The waterward boundary being the Ocean, it is by definition an ambulatory boundary because the monument (the Ocean) is in constant motion.
Under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, in which the US agreed to honor valid private land grants made by the Spanish or Mexican governments while they held portions of CA and other states, the US govt also gained the ownership of what had been held as sovereign land by the Mexican govt. The beds of navigable waterways is considered to be owned by the sovereign in both English Common Law (the basis of our system) and under Spanish & Mexican Law (based on Las Siete Partidas).
Under the law that the Spanish & Mexican Land Grants were made, the sovereign owned to the highest wash of the waves, whether in summer or winter. Under CA law, the sovereign owns to the ordinary high water mark (OHWM), which is most often well below the highest wash of the waves.
When CA became a State, all of the sovereign lands under navigable waterways passed from the federal govt to the State govt. Any tidelands that are in private ownership have their base title in the form of a Tide Lands Patent from the State. I have not heard that Mr. Khosla holds such a patent. even if he did, there is established case law that even privately held tide lands are subject to the Public Trust Easement.
In CA, the State has actually been pretty generous to the Rancho owners when it comes to interpreting coastal boundaries. Instead of holding them to the more draconian Spanish & Mexican definition of the edge of sovereign land - at the highest wash of the waves - the boundary between the sovereign bed of the Ocean (including tidelands) and the private upland ownership is considered to be at the OHWM, just like the rest of the land in the State.
So if Mr. Khosla wants to interpret his description according to the original grant survey and the law under which the grant was made, perhaps he should pull his claim back to the base of the bluff and accede the full extent of the sand beach to the State.
I expect the trial judgment to be overturned or remanded with instructions to render a judgment in line with Federal and State case law.
Of course the problem is that a meander line definition is tied to a grant from the federal government of lands owned by the federal government. In this case the patent is an acknowledgment of a pre-existing parcel per international agreement. So it really is a question of what was granted by the Mexican government, because the federal patent is silent on addition of limiting factors such as the public trust easement.
The article mentions there is precedence in California that says Mexican grants described by metes without mention of the sea or shore were meant to grant to the line per those metes, rather than an ambulatory line depending on a nearby water body. The fact that the Judge mentioned that this would encompass tidelands or lands under water is beside the point (although it makes for good storyline).
It looks like the Judge was bound by a previous higher court decision to me. But, I wouldn't be surprised if a higher court makes some distinction between this case and the precedent. That would be tough for a lower court Judge to do in this case because it's going to have to be pretty creative.
Last week we drove over to Pigeon Point Light Station. On the way down Route 1 I saw the sign, "Martins Beach Road." I didn't really get a good look at it because I just caught a glimpse of it as it passed by and there was a lot of brush on the west side of the highway there.
from City of L.A. v. Venice Peninsula Properties, 205 Cal. App. 3d 1522 (1988):
Subsequently, the California Supreme Court granted hearing and rendered an opinion upholding the judgment of the trial court. That decision was ultimately overturned by the United States Supreme Court in an opinion filed April 17, 1984 ( Summa Corp. v. California (1984) 466 U.S. 198 [80 L.Ed.2d 237, 104 S.Ct. 1751]). The matter was remanded to the Supreme Court of California "for further proceedings not inconsistent with [the opinion of the United States Supreme Court].
It appears the California Supreme Court cite is City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Properties, 31 Cal. 3d 288 (1982) is the one reversed by SCOTUS.
Thanks for the cite Dave. I'll have to read it, sounds interesting. If there's a road and beach of same name, did the public use it for many years before the new rich owner came along?
I think the root of the controversy is the County of San Mateo ordered him (the rich guy) to allow the public to use Martins Beach Road to get to the beach. It looks like his latest ploy is to say there is no public beach to get to. I may have some details of the case wrong. Another Judge ordered him to allow access in September at least until he gets a State Coastal Permit allowing him to do something different.
Rusty Areias (pronounced Uh-Ray-us, he is mentioned in the article) was Director of the California Department of Parks and Recreation when I started there in December, 2000. He is a former State Senator. He left that job to run for re-election to the State Senate about 2002 or so and lost. I guess he is now just a lobbyist, a real political hack.
> Of course the problem is that a meander line definition is tied to a grant from the federal government of lands owned by the federal government. In this case the patent is an acknowledgment of a pre-existing parcel per international agreement. So it really is a question of what was granted by the Mexican government, because the federal patent is silent on addition of limiting factors such as the public trust easement.
In Texas, it is well settled that grants made under Mexican sovereignty are to be construed according to the laws then in effect, both the principles of Spanish Civil Law and the statutes of Mexico in force at the time.
Spanish Civil Law has quite a bit to say about the rights that are retained in beaches and watercourses. I wonder what in California law or international treaty negates that.
"it is well settled that grants made under Mexican sovereignty are to be construed according to the laws then in effect, both the principles of Spanish Civil Law and the statutes of Mexico in force at the time"
I think you misinterpreted my post. That is the same thing I proposed, I assume it is treated that way due to international agreement at the time, rather than a Texas Law (being it's in CA). TX may be a bit different due to it's republic status at one time.
By the nature of it I don't think CA law can change the interpretation (although it appears they may have tried). But I haven't read the case (or cases).